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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Conference of African Studies in Uppsala in 
June 2011, at an Oruka-panel organized by Gail Presbey and Anke Graness. I am grateful to both, also for many 
valuable exchanges over the years, on Oruka’s work and African philosophy more widely. I feel the same 
gratitude to my Kenyan colleagues in Nairobi, Oriare Nyarwath, Juma Ndovu, Joseph Situma, Muyila Wafula, 
Francis Owakah and others, as well as D.A. Masolo and Bruce Janz both based in the USA. I consider myself 
most fortunate to have encountered Prof. Oruka in person, discussing his work with him in documented 
interviews in 1993 and 1995. 




This paper discusses Odera Oruka’s philosophical work fr m the perspective of its emphasis 
on the ‘practical’ impetus that Oruka himself underlin d. In different ways, his various 
projects - his sage philosophy, his philosophy of liberty, his environmental philosophy and, 
perhaps most importantly, his critiques of African ( d implicitly Kenyan) social and political 
realities - can be seen as manifestations of his commitment to the practical relevance and 
social significance of knowledge, and his conviction about the potentially liberating force of 
philosophical critique. Here, I try to provide an overall sketch of this agenda, seeking to 
initiate more thorough and detailed discussion for the future. As a main reference point for 
discussion, I look at how the term ‘humanism’ has been used (and can be used) to describe 
Oruka’s work, in contrast to the invocation of this term by some nationalist political 
ideologies, in particular Moi’s so-called ‘nyayo philosophy’. Oruka’s work could be more 
explicitly appreciated and explored, I argue, for the ways in which he observed and actively 
criticized instances of inhumanity and ‘false humanism’ in post-colonial Africa. 
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We are in the season of light but we are in the epoch of darkness. There 
is a glimmer that democracy is coming and coming to stay. But 
democracy or no democracy, we are still in great darkness about much 
that we need to know. (Oruka 1992, 30) 
 
Introduction 
There can be little doubt that H. Odera Oruka’s philosophy was one of practical engagement. 
By questioning common assumptions, clarifying concepts, and using theoretical reflection to 
reconsider human fundamentals as well as concrete social and political issues in Africa, he 
pursued a practical goal to improve society. In particular, in his own society in Kenya – where 
he was based, as one of a few internationally cited African intellectuals who stayed on the 
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continent, he faced the hardships of everyday life on different fronts.  Yet he was 
astonishingly productive in terms of published intellectual output. In addition to his prolific 
systematic philosophical works, he regularly wrote newspaper articles, thereby extending the 
philosophical questioning process to a wide readership of fellow citizens whom academic 
philosophers could rarely address. Indeed, his practical engagement and commitment through 
the way he perceived, learned and employed philosophy, has been worked out and highlighted 
by several scholars, most recently in extended studies by Anke Graness (2011) and Oruka’s 
student Oriare Nyarwath (2009). Yet these studies should be seen rather as eye-openers and 
stepping-stones towards further exploration of Oruka’s wide-ranging thought than as definite 
or final assessments. 
 
 Over the years, Oruka’s work has been discussed most th roughly and consistently by 
Gail Presbey (e.g. 2000; 2002a; 2002b; 2007), who is a leading authority on Oruka’s sage 
philosophy project and one of the few continuing to practice this important approach as a 
research method. Many others have, in the meantime, commented upon or used Oruka’s work, 
more than can be named and cited here (e.g. Masolo 1994; 1997a; 1997b; 2006; Ochieng’-
Odhiambo 1997; 2010; Janz 1998; 2009; Wiredu 1997). Despite the diverse opinions we may 
encounter in the interpretation and assessment of his sage philosophy project (Oruka 1991) or 
his ‘four trends’ perspective on the field of African philosophy (Oruka 1990), his paramount 
commitment to practical and practically relevant matters will not be questioned by anyone. As 
a philosopher, he employed skills of critical reflection and basic questioning to provide 
guidelines for better orientation of intellectual debates among members of the academic 
community as well as social debates within the wider public. 
 
Indeed, Oruka himself took great care to spell out and emphasize the basic practical 
orientation of his work. To remind us briefly, the title of his posthumously published 
collection of essays, selected by him, is Practical philosophy: in search of an ethical 
minimum (Oruka 1997). Picking up on this title and the program it represents, Anke Graness 
(2011) has recently provided an engaging book-length discussion of social justice from what 
we may call an Orukan perspective, contextualizing his arguments within the contemporary 
global debate on social justice. Oruka can be understood as having advocated that philosophy 
itself, within and beyond academia, "has to be made sagacious" (Oruka in Graness and Kresse 
eds. 1997, 251-260, esp. 253-4). The adjective sagacious can perhaps best be understood to 
mean driven by the impetus of an insight perceived as ‘wise’, with a view to the practical 
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benefit within a social context (see Kresse 2009; for an extended contextual study, see Kresse 
2007). This expression pushes for the practical commit ent and social relevance of 
philosophy, contrasting, along these lines, ‘the mere philosopher’ (lacking this attitude) from 
the ‘sage proper’. In contrast to the former who, in Oruka’s words, merely “looks for pure 
knowledge and tries to express knowledge”, the latter (whether or not he or she is an 
academic) actually “cares about knowledge” and thus adds a “moral spirit” to knowledge 
(Oruka in Graness and Kresse eds. 1997, 254; my emphasis). So, the sage proper is defined by 
this moral dimension as one who seeks to put knowledge and wisdom to good use for the 
benefit of society. 
 
We can see the commitment to the promotion of human welfare illustrated in Oruka’s own 
work, in the leading idea of a sagacious commitment of philosophy that holds together the 
multiple aspects of his engagement. His concise but suggestive philosophical treatise, The 
Philosophy of Liberty (1991; 2nd ed. 1996), develops a conception of freedom that addresses 
basic material contexts and bodily needs of human bei gs, and views economic and political 
self-determination as interlinked aspects of major practical concern. In the second edition of 
this book, Oruka added an outspoken, illustrative and critical discussion of the disappointing 
state of affairs in Africa (1996, esp. 87-110), and of the enduring (and seemingly paradoxical) 
state of ‘unfreedom’ in ‘post-independence’ times (cf. Oginga 1968), in economic, political 
and ideological respects. As he saw it, this was baed on the continuing international 
dependencies that global strategies of ‘under-development’ have kept in place. In the first 
edition, Oruka had only hinted at the need for these concrete issues of African contemporary 
postcolonial realities to be addressed in an inclusive and comprehensive discussion of ‘liberty’ 
with special reference to Africa, a direction of critique he intended to pursue (Oruka 1991, 86-
87). There, he had left it at rather vague and general implicit comments pointing at African 
experiences when discussing ‘Marxist-existentialist’ positions on liberty, and their sub-
differentiations between ‘ruling’ and ‘dominant’ classes, the former referring to national 
political elites and the latter to international politico-economic (usually capitalist) power 
centres responsible for ongoing structural dependencies. For cases that commonly apply to 
contemporary Africa, he saw the locally based ruling class de facto acting as a kind of ‘filter’, 
mediating and translating pressures and directives from the externally situated dominant class 
(Oruka 1991, 40-44). In the second edition, he went much further and provided examples 
from various African countries and their postcolonial experiences, illustrating his discussion 
of ‘the paradox of Independence as still unfreedom’ (Oruka 1996, 99ff). As a bottom-line, in 
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order to provide a future perspective for true liberty in African societies, “new ideas” (Oruka 
1996, 110) and normative commitments would have to replace the old ideologies of 
dependency that had continued (yet somewhat become transformed) from colonial to 
postcolonial times. 
 
Oruka’s most well-known and widely discussed sage philosophy project, in which he 
documented the thoughts of non-academic yet socially recognised thinkers, can be seen to 
address some practical concerns as well - not least the stubborn historical (and racially 
underpinned) Eurocentric prejudice against Africans’ ability to think critically or 
philosophically. This has been richly discussed, compared, commented upon and applied in 
philosophical research, making a strong contribution o research on philosophical traditions in 
Africa and beyond. Finally, a string of politically concerned articles and essays underline what 
we might call a primary concern with the practical in Oruka’s work; this includes critical 
reflections on global and regional power structures; on foreign aid and development practices; 
on autocratic political leadership; on the negligence of ecology in ethics (especially Oruka 
1994), and other topics (for the broadest coverage of the spectrum of his intellectual activities, 
see Oruka 1997; Graness and Kresse eds 1997). 
 
Humanism: The True and the False 
As a useful conceptual label, we may think of Oruka’s philosophical project as advocating the 
idea of a ‘true humanism’, while engaging in unveiling and fighting forms of ‘false 
humanism’ that he saw at work in political and academic contexts that he was concerned with. 
When starting to prepare for this paper, I went over my own brief introduction to the volume 
Sagacious reasoning (Kresse In Graness and Kresse eds. 1997, 11-18). Back then, I was 
reminded, I had already flagged up the issue of practical relevance in Oruka’s philosophical 
work overall, and presented his corpus on sage philosophy as an important aspect of his 
overall drive to critical questioning, reconsideration, and social change. Re-reading my text, it 
struck me that the term ‘humanism’ came up more oftn than I had expected. Pondering this 
with hindsight, it seems to me that this term might indeed have something more to offer: as an 
overarching conceptual principle it summarizes and qualifies Oruka’s work, while it can also 
be used to discuss it critically and productively. When I stated back then that “the evolvement 
of a specific understanding of ‘humanism’ was one of Oruka’s major concerns from the 
beginning to the end of his work” (Kresse 1997, 14), it seems my thoughts were already going 
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in this direction. This position is also supported by Oriare Nyarwath’s recent Ph.D. thesis 
which discusses Oruka’s complete philosophical work in overview (Nyarwath 2009). In his 
concluding summary, Nyarwath re-emphasises the prevailing normative role of philosophy 
for Oruka, employing the term ‘humanism’, as he said Oruka would do, to refer to “the 
promotion of human dignity and the equality of human life” (Nyarwath 2009, 249). 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I will try to use ‘humanism’ as a starting point and a kind of 
ordering principle for my reflections and the attempt to provide a rough sketch of a broad 
intellectual portrait of Odera Oruka, drawing from selected textual samples (and a related 
recent paper, Kresse 2012). In doing so, I will contrast conceptions of ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
humanism as they have been employed in the context of African political discourse and its 
presentation and theorization by African statesmen, political ideologies and commentaries. 
 
Hereby, I am borrowing from Paulin Hountondji’s distinction between true and false 
pluralism in the final chapter of his classic African philosophy: myth and reality (1983, 2nd ed. 
1996; first published in French in 1976). Hountondji was criticising the theoretically reductive 
and practically suppressive positions employed by African political rulers and governments in 
the early postcolonial period which were drawing from a relativist conception of ‘cultural 
pluralism’ based on the anthropological discourse of the time. In that context, African cultures 
were presented as units that were different and distinct from others (e.g. European or Asian 
ones), and on a political level their demand to equal recognition and material provisions was 
pushed. Yet these African cultures, commonly under th  reductive singular of ‘African 
traditional culture’, were often presented as largely homogenous and static units. For 
Hountondji, this was clearly a false assumption that belied the historical fact of the existent 
internal dynamics and contestations within African cultures (and their lively exchange with 
others). Hountondji detected a political motif in this kind of presentation, which the new 
postcolonial rulers pushed in order to sanction ande hance their control over a political 
agenda of nationalisation and unification policies. Under these circumstances, dissenting 
voices were suppressed in the name of a static image of (supposedly collectively binding but 
actually prescribed) ‘African traditional values’ – which can be linked to the mistaken idea of 
a clearly delineated and overarching system of ‘African traditional religion’ (still popularly 
referred to as ‘ATR’ in some academic circles). In contrast, Hountondji was advocating the 
need to observe and discuss (with a view to Africa’s past) the existence of many instances and 
dynamic traditions of ‘internal pluralism’ in African cultures and societies, with open political 
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contestations, debates and exchanges of arguments. In turn, and with a view to the present, 
Hountondji found it necessary and fruitful to pick up and engage with them on various levels. 
(This is a parallel I found inspiring, but we may or may not want to consider more, in 
comparison, in the ensuing discussion.) 
 
Drawing from Hountondji, I here regard as ‘false humanism’ the ideological invocation of a 
humanist perspective within actual processes of suppressing political opponents or dissenting 
voices. By ‘true humanism’, in contrast, I refer to the dedicated commitment, manifested in 
someone’s actions, to the improvement of the overall circumstances of living of people, in the 
name of the global community of human beings. It will not be surprising that I take Oruka’s 
work to represent a position of ‘true humanism’; this position should be concretized and 
elaborated upon more than I can do in this brief contribution, and it should also be thoroughly 
questioned. I will illustrate my sketch of it below, after dealing with some paradigmatic 
positions of ‘false humanism’. However, it is important to note that a clear-cut distinction 
between ‘true’ and ‘false’ might in reality not always be applicable or tenable. Not only does 
this differentiation imply assumptions about the motivations of a social actor concerned 
(information that we do not always have), but also the empirical field of the dynamic (and 
partly dialectical) oppositions and political contestations might often be too complex or 
blurred for us to clearly identify positions in this binary manner. 
 
Of course, the term 'humanism' itself has been subject to a range of critical interrogations and 
discussions in the humanities, particularly from post-structuralist positions advocating the 
need to apply a hermeneutics of suspicion. I may not fundamentally disagree with this (though 
I am not completely sure), but for the purposes of this paper I am limiting myself to the 
explicit usages of the term within African political discussions relevant here. 
 
‘False Humanism’ in African Political Discourse: Dressing up Autocracy 
Over the postcolonial decades in Africa, a range of governments and individual political rulers 
have employed much rhetorical power and persuasion to dress up the increasingly autocratic 
nature of the political realities in their countries. This is well documented, and as an 
ideological sibling to ‘African socialism’ (in different forms and interpretations) and ‘African 
nationalism’ (likewise), the label of ‘African humanism’ got to play a prominent role in this as 
well (cf. Kresse 2012). In stating this, I do not want to be misunderstood to be simply 
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dismissing these terms or the ideologies they stand for. Indeed, they are rooted in important 
historical developments and political debates in response to dismissive and demeaning 
attitudes and a grand narrative that was first employed by the European colonial powers. I 
think these ideological positions initially had a fruitful impact on politics and political 
discourse in Africa, but they became more ambivalent and questionable with time, the more 
decisively a pre-defined and exclusive meaning of them was employed by rulers and 
governments whose political dominance became more and more dogmatic. 
 
‘African humanism’ was most explicitly used as a programmatic term for a national ideology 
in Zambia, where President Kenneth Kaunda coined a doctrine with this name. He appraised 
the sensible and collective nature of certain ‘tradi ional’ African cultural values, and implored 
the citizens to adhere to an implicit normative consensus to which they seemed bound by 
cultural, regional and national affinity. Thus ‘humanism’ was employed as a strong rhetorical 
means and conceived as a basis and underpinning of political unity in the existent one-party 
state (which itself was taken to be a representation of social consensus). In their nationalist 
ideologies, Kaunda and other African leaders operating along the same kind of rhetorical line 
- such as Nkrumah, Nyerere, Senghor, and others - invoked the idea of a common basic 
humanism underlying their respective visions and versions of ‘Africanity’ or ‘African 
personality’. In parallel, the image of an overarching traditional African society (across 
nations) that was particularly humane, ‘man-centred’ and oriented toward solidarity and 
‘mutual aid’ was pushed (Kaunda 1968, 4-5). 
 
As such, African society was taken to be characterised by a humane orientation, governed by 
principles of ‘familyhood’ (in Kiswahili: ujamaa) that were to be used and recreated by 
nation-building policies as in Nyerere’s Tanzania, for instance, for the benefit of the 
development of a supposedly modern African state and citizenry (see Nyerere 1973). These 
ideas were coined initially as part of liberating ideologies of anti-colonial independence 
movements, but they turned dogmatic after these move ents had taken over political power. 
Among the first generation of political rulers of newly independent African countries, there 
were quite a few ‘philosopher kings’, as Wiredu called them alluding to Plato (Wiredu 1996, 
146), who were the intellectual architects of the political space within which they later also 
ruled. If this was done in the name of African humanism, ‘humanism’ was surely invoked 
under false pretence, when, in the name of social solidarity, familyhood, and ‘traditional 
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African values’, political rivals were oppressed or even outlawed, and all significant decisions 
made from top to bottom without any relevant democrati  consultation or election processes. 
 
In the case of Kenya, where Odera Oruka lived and worked most of his life (apart from the 
years of university studies in the USA and Sweden), this can be illustrated when looking at 
the decades after Independence, under the presidential regimes of both Jomo Kenyatta (1963-
1978) and Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002). Kenyatta started turning Kenya into a de facto one-
party state from 1968 on, when he and his governing KANU party made political work for 
opposition parties practically impossible and suppressed all possibilities for the public voicing 
of discontent. An example of this is the banning of Kenya’s only remaining opposition party, 
the Kenyan People’s Union (KPU) which had been newly founded in 1966 by disappointed 
members of Kenyatta’s KANU government who had become frustrated with the 
government’s lack of touch with ordinary citizens. The KPU was silenced and its members 
and supporters threatened with force or actually put in detention. This happened to the leader 
of KPU and former KANU founding member and Vice-Presid nt, Oginga Odinga (1911-
1994). 
 
In addition, the youth were not spared - for instance, the then 22-year old Abdilatif Abdalla in 
Mombasa, who later became a famous Swahili poet through the publication of Sauti ya Dhiki 
(1973), a collection of his poems written in detentio . Abdalla had been writing and 
distributing anonymous pamphlets critical of Kenyatta’s KANU government, even comparing 
its ‘dictatorial’ features with that of the recently overcome British colonialists and the ongoing 
white apartheid regime in South Africa (Abdalla 1968; unpublished). Abdalla was sentenced 
to three years in solitary confinement for treason, purportedly in the interest of national unity 
and national security during the volatile period of ‘A ricanisation’ policies in Kenya, when 
Kenyatta and KANU tightened their exclusive grip on power. In public speeches at the time, 
Kenyatta likened the opposition KPU-supporters to treacherous ‘snakes’ who can and indeed 
should be crushed (Kenyatta 1968, 343-344). In contrast, he introduced the quasi-biographical 
volume of his collected speeches with an endorsement of humane ujamaa politics in which 
the conception of familyhood, he said, should be extended further to include the whole of 
humanity (Kenyatta 1968, p.xi). 
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Later on, under Moi’s presidency (1978-2002), we similarly witnessed a glaring gap between 
Moi’s public and seemingly humanist ideology centred around the terms ‘peace, love and 
unity’, and his authoritarian demand to subordination and blind, unthinking following to 
himself as the undisputable supreme ruler. In a public speech in the early 1980s, he demanded 
of the Kenyan people “to sing like parrots - to sing whatever song I sing, just like I did when 
Kenyatta was still ruling” (quoted in Ngugi 1986, 62). This was Moi’s admonition to Kenyans 
to adhere to the ‘nyayo principle’ which he coined to characterize his lead rship, which itself 
gained authority only through its relational referenc  to Kenyatta before him: nyayo means 
‘footsteps’ in Kiswahili, and the implication here is that the president’s footsteps - the 
directives and directions of previous and current presidents - have to be followed whatever the 
case (Moi 1986). A national ideology under the authori arian demand (and title) of nyayo on 
the one hand, and the creation of an image of social harmony by invoking peace, love and 
unity on the other, put a lot of pressure on people disaffected with the government, and on 
potential dissidents. Indeed, who would want to be publicly seen to stand against peace, love, 
or unity, or to be identified as a threat to them? The humanist appearance of nyayo ideology, 
through the positive conceptual connotations that it invokes on the surface, is unveiled as 
deceiving, once the strict nyayo order, to step in line and follow on blindly, has properly made 
itself understood. 
 
The above are instances and manifestations of falsehumanism as they occurred in Kenya, 
where Oruka witnessed them, fought against them, and in response developed features of what 
we may call a ‘true’ or genuine philosophical humanism. Let us first look at his own 
descriptions and critical assessments of the situation in Kenya and Africa on the whole. One 
dark and (almost) desperate yet clear-cutting version of them he provided in 1978, in an 
article on “Philosophy and humanism in Africa”. For the purposes of his discussion, he 
notably used the fictive yet representative country of ‘ARID’, short for what he calls the 
African Republic of Inhumanity and Death, as an “example of the degree to which inhumanity 
has replaced humanism” in Africa (Oruka 1997, 138). Here is a chilling quote from this 
article, characterizing the state of affairs in ARID as a representative postcolonial state in 
Africa which has completely lost the sociable and humane features previously flagged up by 
the ‘philosopher kings’ (as seen above). In this scenario, political structures, an infrastructure 
of power, and an arbitrary will deciding upon life and death, all revolve around the figure of a 
ruthless absolute ruler: 
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The authority is omnipresent. The police force and the state security militia 
form the very severe and persuasive hand of the political authority; they arrest, 
torture, detain and kill with impunity and indiscriminately, except for the 
unmistakable members and associates of the regime, who must not be touched 
except by the order and green light from the supreme political person. 
Members of the regime who fall out with him or whom he deems not strong in 
their loyalty he orders to be wiped out with the utmost speed (Oruka 1997, 
142).  
 
When I asked Oruka , in an interview in 1995, about his sketch above of the political 
postcolonial scenario in Africa that he depicted in the late 1970s, he replied upon reflection 
that his writings had sadly been confirmed by the political realities, and (in the cases of 
Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia) even ‘over confirmed’ (Oruka in Graness and Kresse eds. 
1997, 259). Under such conditions, as Oruka put it back then, “humanity has sunk” (Oruka 
1997, 143), but not the yearning within the population for a more humane world – and 
according to Oruka, it is one of philosophy’s first and most basic tasks to work towards the 
establishment or restoration of humane conditions of living. This is work for practical 
‘humanism’ in the sense of, as he puts it, a basic “quality and security of human life” (Oruka 
1997, 138). For Oruka, philosophy, not least in its broad conception as ‘free thinking’ (Oruka 
1997, 145), is and should be inextricably linked to a vision of humanism, and to the 
conceptual and practical ways of realising such a vision. The case made here, in this one brief 
article, might in parallel also apply to Oruka’s overall output of philosophical works (though 
of course this cannot really be worked out here). One way, and perhaps the most important 
way for philosophy of making itself relevant, is by insisting on the practical use and liberating 
potential of its intellectual force - this is another way of saying, perhaps, that philosophy has 
to become (or should indeed stay) sagacious; that is, to be employed to good use, for the 
benefit of one’s social peers. 
 
Oruka pursued the agenda of using philosophy for the benefit of mankind from early on, and 
revised and expanded his own work accordingly, documenting and clarifying his thought 
process. This can, for instance, be seen in the chapters he added to the second edition of 
Punishment and terrorism in Africa (1985; first 1976): following critical remarks by readers 
and reviewers, he added two chapters discussing contemporary practical dimensions of the 
death penalty and ‘legal terrorism’ in Africa, a term he introduces “as a fitting expression 
describing what generally goes on in the treatment of both offenders and many innocent 
citizens in much of modern Africa” (Oruka 1985, 103). What Oruka means, and further on 
illustrates and discusses by involving examples, is the misuse of the judiciary and legal 
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frameworks by morally corrupt governments and rulers. Oruka’s following statement on 
‘legal terrorism’, taking a bold stand and giving an unmistakenly clear critical message to 
those in power - written and published in Kenya during the period in which Moi had just 
confirmed and invigorated one-party rule under his leadership (in 1982) - is, by any standards, 
a remarkable testimony to outspoken political critique of oppressive governments by an 
African intellectual based in Africa: 
It is that law is essentially an instrument used by the state (i.e. the group in 
political power) to give itself the trappings of legitimacy for inhuman conduct 
such as the mistreatment, torture and murder of people considered politically or 
socially undesirable. Law becomes identical with the whims of those in 
political power (Oruka 1985, 106). 
Here, we see an engaged philosopher working against ll-abounding moral and political 
deterioration and decay in his country and continen, a d, as he put it in the preface to the 
second edition, towards ‘the building of a humane society’ in Africa as an ultimate goal 
(Oruka 1985, p.xiii). 
 
Conclusion - ‘True humanism’: Oruka’s perspective and reference-points 
For a vision of political future, how it could be (or could have been) in terms of productive 
and serious engagement with the people’s wishes and interests in Kenya, Oruka turns to a 
discussion of one of his political heroes and indeed an iconic alternative leader-figure of the 
1980s and 1990s. The Luo politician Jaramogi Oginga Odinga had this appeal not only for 
many Kenyan Luos, but also for many other disgruntled Kenyans all over the country (as the 
young Abdilatif Abdalla, mentioned above). Odinga, at the time the highest cultural leading-
figure of the Kenyan Luo community (ker), was also the former leader of the Kenyan People’s 
Union (KPU), perhaps the only serious opposition party that Kenya had ever experienced, at 
least before the reinstatement of multi-party politics in 1992 when he again became a focal 
figure for opposition groups. He had also been a leading figure of the anti-colonial nationalist 
struggle for independence, one of the founding members of the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU), Kenya’s first Vice-President under Kenyatta, and indeed the one who played a key 
role when the negotiations for Kenyatta’s release from colonial imprisonment in the period 
leading up to Independence was on the cards. 
 
In 1992, Oruka published a book on Odinga that combined the explicit topical concern with 
national Kenyan politics with the ideas of his sage philosophy program, under the title Oginga 
Odinga: His Philosophy and Beliefs. This book was to be the first of what was anticipated to 
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be a series of book-length studies of individual African sages (Oruka in Graness and Kresse 
eds. 1997, 252). However, due to Oruka’s tragic early demise, it turned out to be the only one. 
In Oruka’s summarizing description, Odinga appears as the one remaining representative of a 
true humanist position in politics in Kenya, a thoughtful, reasonable, and moral decision-
maker for the people and the nation, in contrast to Kenyatta or Moi who are cast as self-
interested and power-hungry leaders whose regimes stood for moral decay (Oruka1992, 30-
31; also 6-7). As Oruka put it, “the Kenyatta-Moi Republic had conspicuously declined in 
moral standing” (Oruka 1992, 31; my emphasis). For a book published in 1992, the year of 
the first multi-party elections after almost three decades of one-party rule, and during a period 
of heightened political tension and vulnerability when Moi was still at the height of his power 
and standing for (re-)election for the first time, this was quite a bold and explicit statement to 
make - and the same applies to other statements quoed above. 
 
We could play through the same theme in much more depth, and in relation to a number of 
Oruka’s (further) publications, in order to substanti te the argument here much more, on a 
broader basis and with more focus, about a basic and principled humanist orientation of 
Oruka’s philosophical self-positioning. His position is remarkable not only for his courage or, 
as Anke Graness has worked out in her recent book (2011), for the timeliness with which it 
takes up and approaches the discussion of social justice in a global perspective, long before 
either the topic of social justice or the focus on ‘the global’ had become fashionable. Oruka 
was also timely and outspoken in addressing such sensitive matters as ‘state terrorism’ in 
Africa (in his early book Punishment and Terrorism in Africa, 1976, or such important and 
trendy ones as an ecological turn in ethics, with a focus on what Oruka calls ‘eco-philosophy’. 
Here, arguing from the background of Western philosophy but also drawing from African 
intellectual traditions as well as South Asian ones, he develops an innovative argument and 
original principles for what he called a ‘parental e rth ethics’ (Oruka ed. 1994). This involves 
the social obligation of all human beings to take care of the global ecological conditions that 
we hand over to the next generation, while also providing us with a number of guiding 
principles listed in order of priorities. – In this respect, I found it disappointing to see how 
Oruka’s contribution could be ignored in a recent publication on African conceptual takes on 
‘environmental ethics’ (Ojomo 2010). Finally, his criti al reflections on political structures 
and processes in postcolonial Africa might also have something to offer for current debates on 
postcoloniality in Africa and beyond. 
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Perhaps we could say, in sum, for the purposes of this brief and sketchy article (that remains 
to be elaborated and substantiated further in the future), that the kind of humanism that Oruka 
is arguing and indeed standing for, within the larger scenario of African philosophy or even a 
global field of philosophical debate, is at once fundamental, in terms of addressing the 
conditions of possibility of social change based on an egalitarian conception of humanity, and 
at the same time hands-on, i  terms of being practice-oriented and seeking to deliver when it 
comes to practical questions of implementing rights and principles that are actually seen to 
make a difference for both the possibility and realization of social change. As a practical 
humanist and philosopher of humanism, building, as he said, a humane society in Africa and
beyond was his goal. 
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